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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - REMEDY FOR TRESPASS WHERE NO INJURY IS SHOWN
At common law, every unauthorized entry upon another s property was
deemed a trespass, the theory being that "
the law bounds every man s property, and is his fence
I" A number of strict rules which marked the common
law action of trespass are still evident in our modem law and the severity of them
results pnmarily from the fact that the action had a cnminal origin. It was available as a remedy for forcible breaches of the king s peace, and the royal courts
were concerned chiefly with punishment of the crime so that when found guilty,
the trespasser usually was fined and refusal to pay led to imprisonment. The
award of damages to the plaintiff was incidental to the criminal proceeding.'
The criminal character which marked the action at its origin was gradually
discarded and as trespass emerged into its modern status, two distinct theories
underlying liability were developed. First, by retaining the primary function of
its criminal origin, the action continued to be directed at the vindication of the
possessor s legal right. Invasion, the unwarranted interference with another s possession, was the basis for liability and the injury was the infringement of the right
to exclusive possession. Thus an undamaged plaintiff merely meant one who
had suffered no material loss. Second, another basis of liability was added in the
field of torts. In this status, trespass came to have a normal use as a tort remedyand material injury, implied by law to result from every trespass, formed the basis
of liability. Reference to an undamaged plaintiff merely meant that the harm to
his possession was too slight to permit recovery of actual damages, but not so
insignificant as to bar nominal relief based on an inference of damage resulting
from the trespass. It must be recognized that both theories referred to are clearly
"torte theories; however, for the purpose of making a discernible distinction, it is
appropriate to think of the first as a protection of property rnghts theory and the
second as a vindication of property damage theory.
The majority of American courts have permitted recovery in cases of harmless
trespass, but the decisions have failed to distinguish clearly the two functions of
the remedy and much confusion has resulted. In Mahle v. Gnerson,' the defendants, while hunting, drove across the plaintiff's land without permit but
caused no apparent harm to the property. The court held that the injury was so
slight that no civil action could be maintained. In contrast, a recent Oregon case
illustrates how far the courts have gone to permit recovery. In this case, the
court stated that a person cannot justify a trespass upon another s property by
showing that such trespass resulted in benefit to the owner of the property. Such
a discrepancy can best be explained by analyzing the theory upon which each
decision is based.
A study of the cases involving a trespass from which no pecuniary los' has
resulted, indicates that the courts generally have allowed recovery in three types
of situations, but these cases fail to indicate whether the theory of liability is based
upon an invasion of the plaintiffs possessorv interest or upon implied damage.
In one group of cases, liability is nposed for the purpose of settling boundary
IStar v. Rookesby, 91 Eng. Rep. 295 (1711).
'Woodbine, The Ongm of the Action of Trespass, 33 YALE L. J. 799 (1924),
34 YALE L. J. 343 (1925).
12 WMLSON Crv. CAs. CT. Apr., sec. 764 (Texas, 1885).
'Laurance v. Tucker, 160 Ore. 474, 85 Pac. 2d V74 (1938),
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disputes. Pfieffer v. Grossman" is a good example. In that case the defendant
owned a fence which he mistakenly believed was on his property. A survey
showed otherwise and the plaintiff was given nominal damages in order to settle
the dispute and establish a permanent boundary. Apparently the plaintiff based
his action upon the property damage theory rather than upon his right to exclusive possession. The court found no basis for granting actual tort damages
but since a judgment favorable to the plaintiff would prevent further litigation
and settle the boundary dispute, nominal damages were awarded.' There was
no indication that the decision was based on the theory of implied damage issuing
from the trespass. Thus it may be presumed that the court established liability on
the plaintiff's right to exclusive possession, although such fact was not stated in
the opinion. This would seem to be the theory upon which such cases are decided even though the courts look for a policy served by imposing liability rather
than setting forth the basic concept upon which recovery is granted.
A second group of cases are those in which the plaintiff is awarded nominal
damages so as to prevent the creation of an easement by the runmng of the
statute of limitations, although the defendant is not considered by the court to
be at fault and there is no material injury. Such a situation would arise where
the defendant drives over a portion of the plaintiff's land repeatedly for a long
period of time, which trespassing, if allowed to continue, would result in a right
of way by prescription. To prevent such a result and in order to have a record
of the judgment, the land owner is given nominal damages. Few cases can be
found which present the above situation, probably because such suits are seldom
appealed. However, nominal damages have been awarded in a few cases where
the defendant is without fault and no reason for permitting recovery is given.
Although the opimons do not expressly state that nominal damages are awarded
to prevent the defendant from acquiring an easement by prescription, apparently
that is the policy served by imposing liability. An example of the type under
consideration is Smith v. New England Aircraft Corp. where airplanes of the
defendants were continually flying at low altitudes over a portion of the plaintiffs
land while taking off and landing at a nearby airport. The court held this to be a
'15 Ill.
58 (1858). Accord, McWilliams v. Morgan, 75 Ill.
473 (1874);
Fincannon v. Sudderth, 144 N.C. 587, 57 S.E. 387 (1907); Bragg v. Laraway, 65
Vt. 673, 27 AUt. 402 (1893).
'Case is cited as an example of the group under consideration; however it is
difficult to actually determine the theory upon which the court granted recovery,
the following excerpts from opimon (p. 54) being typical of the confusion found
in such cases: "Such acts are a violation of the owners right of possession, to
redress which the law gives him an action. And the action is maintainable, although the owner is not substantially injured. He is entitled to nominal damages
for the intrusion upon his possession."
"The law implies damage to the owner, and in the absence of proof as to
the extent of the injury, he is entitled to recover nominal damages."
'270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930). Accord, Swetland v. Curtiss Airports
Corp., 41 F 2d 929 (N.D. Ohio, 1930); Anderton v. Watkins, 122 Me. 346, 120
Ad. 175 (1923) (continued parking of airplane by defendant on plaintiff's land,
by mistake, held to constitute trespass); Hern v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587,
241 Pac. 328 (1925) (damages allowed for walking along banks of plaintiffs
stream, fishing in it, and shooting over plaintiff's land); Kraus v. Birnbaum, 200
N.Y. 130, 93 N.E. 474 (1910); Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E.
716 (1906) (erection of telephone lines overhanging plaintiffs land at height of
thirty feet held to constitute trespass); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex,
129, 86 S.W 2d 441 (1935).
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trespass and the plaintiff was given nominal damages. Thus in this group of
cases, as in the previous one, liability fundamentally rests upon the right of the
plaintiff to exclusive possession rather than upon implied damage.
Another group of cases involves liability based on fault. The motive for permitting recovery in such situations apparently is to discourage and prevent such
conduct in the future. In Keesecker v. C. M. McKelvey Co.' it was held that one
who intentionally and without consent enters land in possession of another "is
liable as a trespasser, irrespective of whether harm is thereby caused to any of
his legally protected interests." In Dixon v. Clow,' where a party had an easement in the land of another (the right to cut a watercourse), it was held that the
owner had the right to erect fences across such watercourse and if the other
unnecessarily or wantonly removed them he was liable in damage though no
actual harm was proved. The North Carolina court in the case of Dougherty v.
Stepp'" set out the underlying basis of liability in such cases when it ruled that
from every direct entry upon the soil of another, "
the law infers some damage; if nothing more, the treading down the grass or the herbiage
" This is
the theory which establishes liability on implied damage. The decisions in this
group make no effort to permit recovery for the purpose of vindicating the possessors s legal right to enjoy his property without unwarranted interference. It
seems that if the plaintiff brings his action in tort in cases where the trespasser
is at fault, the courts adhere strictly to the concept of implied damage.
There is a last group of cases which defies classification. They involve neither
a boundary line nor an easement and the courts refuse to impose liability where
the defendant is without fault. These are the situations where the plaintiff brings
his action in tort and the courts (adhering to the property damage theory alone),
being unable to discover a policy upon which to permit recovery, have granted
none. In the classic English decision known as the Thorn Caseu the defendant,
while clipping his hedge, accidentally allowed some of the thorns to fall on the
nlaintiff's land and relief was granted although no damage was found. The trend
of the more recent decisions seems to be away from such a holding. In the
Nitro-glycerine Case- a quantity of dynamite in the defendant's possession exploded and damaged the plaintiff's building. The defendant was without fault
and recovery for even actual damages was refused. In the case of Losee v.
Buchanan' no relief was granted where the defendant's boiler exploded (through
no fault of the defendant) and damaged the plaintiff's building. It is such cases
as the above which have caused much confusion and uncertainty in the action of
trespass. In no way do they explain the fact that there has been an invasion of a
'64 Ohuo App. 29, 27 N.E. 2d 787 (1940). Accord, Harvey v. Mason City &
Ft. D. R. Co., 129 Iowa 322, 105 N.W 958 (1906) semble; Hoyt v. Smith, 187
So. 87 (La., 1939); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Boyd, 67 Md. 32, 10 At. 315 (1887);
Bedlow v. New York Floating Dry Dock Co., 112 N. Y. 263, 19 N.E. 800 (1899);
Moore v. New York El. R. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 863, 4 Misc. Rep. 132 (1893).
See, Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E. 2d 804, 805 (1940).
'24 Wend. 188 (N.Y., 1840).
2018 N.C. 371 (1835).
'Anonymous, Y.B. Ed. IV L 7, pl. 18 (1466).
"Parrott v. Wells Fargo & Co., 15 Wall. 524, 21 L. ed. 206 (1872). Accord.
Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central R. Co. of N.J., 216 F 72 (C.C.A. 2d 1914);
Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 16 Am. Rep. 372 (1873). Notes, 48 HAnv. L.
REv. 218 (1934), 15 B.U.L. REv. 81 (1935).
"51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623 (1873).
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possessory interest upon which liability may readily be established. Such decisions indicate that even in certain situations of trespass resulting in actual damage there can be no recovery. These decisions emphasize that in its modem
application the property damage theory may well be developing into a "fault"
theory but there is no such trend insofar as the theory of unwarranted interference
is concerned. It is difficult to understand the reason for refusing a plaintiff noniinal damages where the defendant is faultless, yet granting relief on the basis of
implied damage where the defendant is at fault. Implied damages are granted on
the theory that every direct entry results in some material miury and therefore it
would seem that the relative fault of the defendant is irrelevant. Thus, from the
standpoint of the property damage theory, nominal damages should be awarded
in every action of trespass. Liability can be based upon the invasion of a possessory interest or upon the theory of implied damage, which, if strictly adhered
to, applies to all entries with or without fault.
From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that the plaintiff has two
grounds upon which to bring an action for trespass where no material loss has
been suffered, and that his choice may determine whether or not he will be
awarded nominal damages. If he is seeking actual damages in a tort action, as is
usually the case, the plaintiff runs the risk that even nominal damages may be
refused where the court finds that the defendant is faultless and that no policy is
served by imposing liability. Where, however, the plaintiff chooses to base his
action on his right to exclusive possession there is little chance that nomnal damages will be refused. Until the courts come to consider the problem under both
theories in any given situation, it would seem that the latter approach is the
better one.
CHARLS

GROMLEY

